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This study examines whether bellwether firms’ management earnings forecasts 
predict future macroeconomic trends and their propensity to issue these forecasts. I 
find that forecasts issued by firms producing/sourcing commodities in a large 
cyclical sector of the economy (defined as bellwether firms) predict real and 
nominal GDP growth and aggregate earnings for the subsequent four quarters. 
Forecasts issued towards the end of a quarter and forecasts by small bellwether 
firms present greater predictive power. When examining the propensity to issue 
forecasts, I find that bellwether firms provide less frequent disclosures than non-
bellwether firms, but bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors issue 
more frequent disclosures than other bellwether firms. These results suggest that 
bellwether firms may be reluctant to issue timely disclosures because their 
investors can learn about them from government announcements. However, 
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1. Introduction  
    Prior studies document that aggregate stock returns move significantly around announcements 
of management earnings forecasts issued by bellwether firms and interpret this result as investors 
using bellwether firms’ disclosed forward-looking information to learn about many other firms in 
the market (e.g., Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer, 2013). In this study, I examine whether 
bellwether firms’ management earnings forecasts predict future macroeconomic indicators in the 
subsequent periods. Different from the existing literature that shows bellwether firms’ disclosed 
forward-looking information has a contemporaneous impact on other firms’ stock values, I 
attempt to demonstrate that bellwether firms’ disclosed forward-looking information is a leading 
indicator of future macroeconomic trends, such as GDP growth and aggregate earnings in the 
following periods. 
    Whether individual bellwether firms’ disclosures predict future macroeconomic indicators is 
an important research question in the macroeconomic forecasting literature because existing 
studies often use aggregate accounting measures to predict future macroeconomic 
announcements. For example, Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014a) find that aggregate earnings 
growth predicts nominal GDP growth in the subsequent three quarters. Konchitchki and 
Patatoukas (2014b) use the largest 100 firms’ accounting profitability as a proxy for aggregate 
earnings and document that this aggregate earnings proxy predicts future real GDP growth. The 
advantage of using an individual bellwether firm’s disclosure rather than an aggregate earnings 
measure to predict future macroeconomic trends is to save information search costs. Following 
an individual bellwether firm’s disclosure is less costly than collecting the majority of (large) 
firms’ announcements. In addition, some bellwether firms issue their management earnings 
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forecasts earlier than the majority of firms’ earnings announcements. This early forward-looking 
information released by an individual bellwether firm is a more timely indicator of future 
macroeconomic trends than aggregate accounting information. 
    In a multivariate empirical analysis, I find that management earnings forecast by bellwether 
firms is an incremental leading indicator of nominal and real GDP growth in the subsequent four 
quarters. This result is robust to predicting either first-released or final-released GDP growth. 
Furthermore, management earnings forecasts by bellwether firms also predict aggregate earnings 
in the subsequent four quarters. In a placebo test, management earnings forecast by non-
bellwether firms do not predict future GDP growth and aggregate earnings. In summary, I 
document robust evidence that individual bellwether firms’ disclosed forward-looking 
information is a leading indicator of future macroeconomic trends. 
    In the robustness test, I validate that these prediction results are mainly driven by bellwether 
firms’ management earnings forecasts issued in the third month of a quarter (i.e., Mar., Jun., 
Sept., and Dec.) and that bellwether firms’ management earnings forecasts issued in the first 
month of a quarter do not predict future GDP growth and aggregate earnings. This finding 
suggests that managers of bellwether firms gradually learn about the state of the economy from 
daily transactions over a quarter; hence, they possess more timely information about future 
macroeconomic trends towards the end of a quarter. This test confirms that it is indeed the 
macroeconomic information possessed by bellwether firms’ managers driving the prediction 
results. 
    I further examine whether my results are driven by only large bellwether firms since prior 
studies often use firm size to identify bellwether firms (e.g., Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner, 2007; 
Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2014b). Results show that management earnings forecasts by small 
 
3 
bellwether firms present stronger predictive power than those by large bellwether firms. Large 
firms usually have more resources to diversify their lines of business or to hedge their exposure 
to market risk than small firms; therefore, small firms are more sensitive to macroeconomic 
shocks than large firms. This robustness check confirms that it is bellwether firms’ nature of 
business that endows their managers with useful and timely information regarding future 
macroeconomic trends. 
    After demonstrating the predictability of bellwether firms’ management earnings forecasts, I 
switch gears to ask whether bellwether firms are willing to provide these timely disclosures. 
Although bellwether firms’ forwarding-looking information helps investors gauge where the 
economy is heading, it is unlikely that managers of bellwether firms care much about supplying 
timely information for macroeconomic forecasts. Assuming that bellwether firms, like all the 
other firms, want to maximize their own values, they would choose to provide timely voluntary 
disclosures if these disclosures create net benefits to the firm itself. Helping investors learn about 
other firms’ values is not going to be on top of bellwether firms’ priority. Therefore, I conjecture 
that bellwether firms are reluctant to provide timely disclosures because of the substitution 
effect.  
    The substitution effect means that investors can obtain useful information about bellwether 
firms from many sources (e.g., government announcements about macroeconomic trends). In 
other words, investors can either use bellwether firms’ timely disclosures to predict GDP or use 
the announced GDP to gauge the performance of bellwether firms. Given that bellwether firms 
do not care about public interests in forecasting macroeconomic trends as much as governments, 
they are less willing to provide frequent disclosures but would rather direct their investors to 
follow government macroeconomic announcements. 
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    However, a group of investors may present strong demand for bellwether firms’ timely 
disclosures. In particular, investors who hold diversified portfolios can use bellwether firms’ 
disclosures to evaluate many securities in their portfolios, so they may pressure bellwether firms 
for frequent and timely disclosures. Since learning market leading indicators from an individual 
bellwether firm is less costly and time-consuming than following the whole market, diversified 
investors who own substantial stakes in an individual bellwether firm may influence this firm’s 
disclosure policy. In light of these two countervailing forces, whether bellwether firms would 
provide frequent disclosures is ultimately an empirical question. 
    On average, I find that bellwether firms issue regular management forecasts less frequently 
than non-bellwether firms. It appears that the substitution effect between bellwether firms’ 
disclosures and public macroeconomic announcements outweighs the stronger demand from 
diversified investors. Specifically, bellwether firms, on average, issue 0.25--0.38 fewer forecasts 
than non-bellwether firms. A one standard deviation increase in the probability of being a 
bellwether firm is associated with a decline of 2.4--3.3% of the standard deviation in disclosure 
frequency. This magnitude is similar to the impact from leverage or profitability, but it is much 
smaller than the impact from size. 
    Furthermore, I analyze the relation between the composition of institutional investors and the 
frequency of bellwether firms’ disclosures. If some investors demand more frequent disclosures 
by bellwether firms because the disclosed information is useful in assessing the values of other 
firms, there should be a positive relation between the disclosure frequency of bellwether firms 
and the percentage of bellwether firms owned by investors who are likely to use this information. 
Following Bushee (1998), I use quasi-indexers to identify investors who hold diversified 
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portfolios and are likely to use bellwether firms’ disclosures to evaluate other firms.1 I find that 
bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors disclose more frequently than other 
bellwether firms, but I fail to find that bellwether firms owned by many diversified institutional 
investors disclose more frequently than other bellwether firms. Put differently, only bellwether 
firms with few institutional investors disclose less frequently than non-bellwether firms, 
probably because they do not face pressure for frequent disclosures. No significant relation 
between diversified investors’ ownership and bellwether firms’ disclosure frequency may be due 
to the weak identification of diversified investors based on the Bushee classification. 
    My findings above are based on associations, so I use exogenous shocks in an attempt to shed 
light on the potential causal effects. Following Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist 
(2014), brokerage house closures are assumed to be unexpected changes in a firm’s information 
environment. I find that while firms, on average, increase their disclosure frequency after 
negative coverage shocks (as in Balakrishnan et al., 2014), bellwether firms do not increase their 
disclosure frequency after brokerage house closures. This result is consistent with the conjecture 
that the loss in analyst coverage does not have a significant impact on bellwether firms’ 
information environment because investors can learn about bellwether firms from many other 
sources. In other words, the marginal benefit of issuing additional forecasts may be low for 
bellwether firms. Therefore, bellwether firms do not react to these shocks by increasing their 
disclosure frequency. On the other hand, bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors 
                                                          
1 Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors into three groups: quasi-indexers are long-term 
diversified investors, dedicated investors are long-term concentrated investors, and transient 
investors are short-term investors. On average, quasi-indexers’ and transient investors’ holdings 
are positively correlated with disclosure frequency, but there is no association between dedicated 




do increase their disclosure frequency after brokerage house closures. This finding suggests that 
institutional investors may pressure these bellwether firms to make frequent disclosures. 
    This study extends the growing literature on linking accounting information with 
macroeconomics. Existing studies show that aggregate accounting information predicts 
macroeconomic indicators, such as nominal GDP growth up to four quarters ahead, forecast 
errors in Production Price Index in the subsequent two months, and future restatements in GDP 
growth and unemployments (e.g., Kothari, Shivakumar, and Ucran, 2013; Konchitchki and 
Patatoukas, 2014a & b; Nallareddy and Ogneva, 2014). This paper complements to the evidence 
in the prior studies by showing that individual bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts released 
before earnings announcement periods predicts the subsequent real and nominal GDP growth. 
The nature of bellwether firms’ business provides their managers timely macroeconomic 
information towards the end of a quarter and their released forward-looking information during 
these non-earnings-announcements periods is a timely indicator of economic activities in the 
subsequent four quarters. 
    This paper further contributes to the institutional investor literature. Many studies focus on 
investment horizons. For instance, Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) argue that short-term investors 
focus on trading, while long-term investors are devoted to monitoring firms. Based on this 
notion, An and Zhang (2013) show that both stock price synchronicity and crash risk are 
positively related to short-term investors’ holdings, but negatively associated with long-term 
investors’ holdings (Callen and Fang (2013) find a similar result on crash risk). However, we 
know little about the role played by long-term diversified investors even though they account for 
two-thirds of institutional investors’ holdings (Bushee and Noe, 2000). Bushee and Noe (2000) 
find a positive relation between diversified investors’ holdings and disclosure quality, and 
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conjecture that high-quality disclosure reduces diversified investors’ monitoring costs. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 
(2010), who argue that diversified investors prefer low-cost information sources because it is too 
expensive to pursue high-cost information sources for many securities in their diversified 
portfolios. My study adds to this literature by identifying a unique demand from diversified 
investors---to learn about market-wide news---however, I fail to show a significant connection 
between the ownership level of diversified investors and the disclosure frequency of bellwether 
firms.2 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the identification of 
bellwether firms. Section 3 examines whether management earnings forecasts by bellwether 
firms predicts future macroeconomic indicators. Section 4 analyzes the propensity of bellwether 
firms to issue management earnings forecasts, and Section 5 concludes. 
  
                                                          
2 Some existing studies also argue and present evidence that disclosure practices match with 
different groups of investors (e.g., Bushee, 2004; Jung, 2013; Kalay, 2014). 
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2. Identification of Bellwether Firms 
    Although investors have frequently used bellwether firms in their discussions, there still lacks 
a formal definition of bellwether firms. In this study, I define bellwether firms as those whose 
disclosures 1) have implications for many other firms in the economy and 2) predict future 
macroeconomic trends. There are at least two approaches to identify bellwether firms. One is a 
time-series approach and the other is a cross-sectional approach. The time-series approach was 
adopted by Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer (2013). Following their terminology, high-
macroeconomic-information-content firms are identified by how well a firm’s performance is 
explained by macroeconomic indicators. The cross-sectional approach pertains to the concept of 
inter-firm network and identifies well-connected firms as potential candidates for bellwether 
firms. In this study, I define bellwether firms as the intersection of high-macro-info firms and 
well-connected firms. In the following subsections, I describe the methodology and the nature of 
business for bellwether firms. 
2.1 High-macroeconomic-information-content firms 
    Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer (2013) identify high-macro-info firms based on how well 
macroeconomic shocks explain a firm’s earnings. Suppose a firm’s earnings are subject to 
macroeconomic shocks and firm-specific shocks: 
𝑒?̃? = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒?̃? + ?̃? 
   𝛽𝑖
𝑒 is the sensitivity of a firm’s earnings to macroeconomic shocks, and 𝜇𝑖 is a constant over 
time. Macroeconomic shocks ?̃? and firm-specific shocks ?̃? both have means of zero and are 
independently and normally distributed with variances V and v, respectively. High-macro-info 
firms are assumed to have a high 𝑅𝑒









    Empirically, the 𝑅𝑒
2 is estimated by regressing a firm’s earnings on aggregate earnings based 
on 20 quarters of data (at least 10 quarters of data are required):3 
𝐸𝑖,𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑚,𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑞 
    Firm-level earnings 𝐸𝑖,𝑞 are measured as quarterly income before extraordinary items deflated 
by the beginning market capitalization. Aggregate earnings 𝐸𝑚,𝑞 are measured as the sum of all 
Compustat firms’ quarterly income before extraordinary items deflated by the sum of the 
beginning market capitalization. I use aggregate earnings as a summary statistic for 
macroeconomic shocks because existing studies have shown that aggregate accounting 
information predicts macroeconomic indicators (e.g., Kothari, Shivakumar, and Ucran, 2013; 
Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2014a). The average value of 𝑅𝑒
2 is 0.11, the median is 0.06, the 
25th percentile is 0.02, and the 75th percentile is 0.16 (see Table 1). 
    What exactly does this earnings R² capture? Earnings R² identifies cyclical business and larger 
sectors of the economy. Cyclical business often involves lump sum fixed investments. Because 
these firms pre-commit to long-term investments, such as equipment or human capital, they 
particularly worry about overcapacity during a downturn. When the overall industry has excess 
capacity and member firms do not have the flexibility to sell their fixed assets or lay off their 
                                                          
3 Measurement errors may be substantial in an estimation procedure that uses only twenty time-
series data points to estimate R². In fact, the low serial correlation, 0.09, indicates this 
measurement issue. When using sixty months of returns to estimate the R², the serial correlation 
increases to 0.47. I find consistent results when using the 60-month returns R² instead of the 20-
quarter earnings R² in the propensity analysis but not in the predictability analysis. 
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employees, their costs maintain high while their profits are shrinking due to a price war among 
competitors. Therefore, high fixed-costs business is likely to present a cyclical performance (i.e., 
riding with peak, recession, trough, and expansion).4 One popular competing strategy adopted by 
high fixed-costs firms is to increase their economic scale. As a result, many cyclical industries 
account for a large portion of the economy conditional on a strong supportive demand for their 
products. For example, the automobile industry represented a large portion of the U.S. economy 
in the 1960s and General Motors was considered a bellwether firm. 
    During my sample period from 1996-2010, large cyclical sectors of the U.S. economy have 
shifted from traditional manufacturing, such as chemicals, machinery, metals, and mining, to 
high technology sectors, such as semiconductors, internet, software, and biotechnology. 
Illustration A presents high-macro-info industries based on the number of member firms having 
an earnings R² greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). I use Global Industry Classification 
Standard to define 67 industries. Chemicals (GICS: 151010) was ranked as the first in 1996 and 
1998 (recall the 1996 earnings R² is generated by data from 1992-1996). Producing chemical 
commodities is a cyclical business because its production requires a high level of fixed 
investments. Dow Chemicals and DuPont are identified as high-macro-info firms because they 
are major players in this sector. After millennium, the U.S. economy shifts towards high 
technology sectors. Semiconductors (GICS: 453010) was ranked as the top five high-macro-info 
industries from 1999-2010 (see Illustration A). Semiconductor fabrication plants (fabs) require 
many expensive devices to function. The estimated range of building a fab is about $1-4 billion. 
Such a high level of fixed investments makes semiconductor firms vulnerable to overall business 
                                                          
4 During a boom, high fixed-costs industry may face under-capacity. Price rises because of a lack 
of supply to meet demand, and profit increases. The inflexibility to adjust capacity leads profits 
to comove with the business cycle. 
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cycles. Since semiconductor chips are used in many electronic devices, such as computer and 
cell phones, this industry has grown to represent a large portion of the economy. Well-known 
semiconductor firms that are identified as high-macro-info firms are Intel, Texas Instruments, 
and Qualcomm. 
    Large cyclical industries are not limited to only high fixed-investments business. Industries 
that face cyclical demands are also highly cyclical. Media (GICS: 254010) was ranked as the 
first in 2002, the first in 2009 and the second in 2010 because media industry relies on 
advertising revenue, which is highly cyclical, and is usually hurt the most after a downturn. 
Well-known media firms that are identified as high-macro-info firms are Walt Disney and News 
Corp. Financial institutions, such as commercial banks, REITs, insurance, capital markets, and 
mortgage finance, are also cyclical because the supply of and the demand for capital move with 
business cycles. 
    In summary, descriptive statistics show that firms operating in a large cyclical sector of the 
economy tend to have a high earnings R². Because the nature of cyclicality and the 
representation of an industry in the economy, managers of these high earnings R² firms are 
assumed to possess timely macroeconomic information by observing their daily transactions. 
2.2 Well-connected firms 
    Another way to identify bellwether firms is based on the inter-firm network. Suppose each 
firm i experiences a shock 𝑚?̃?. When a firm is connected to many other firms in the network, its 
performance is more subject to common shocks (∪𝑚?̃? or ∩𝑚?̃?). Forward-looking information by 
these well-connected firms may help investors learn about common shocks that apply to many 
other connected firms in the economy. For instance, Aobdia, Caskey, and Ozel (2014) use inter-
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industry trade flows to identify well-connected (central) industries and show that information 
released by firms in the central industries predicts earnings and stock returns of firms in their 
linked industries. 
    Instead of using trade flows, which data is only available at the industry level, Hoberg and 
Phillips (2014) develop a firm-level network measure based on textual analysis. They first create 
a word vector for each 10-K’s Item 1 business description, and then calculate the cosine 
similarity of two firms’ word vectors to measure the number of overlapping words. If this cosine 
similarity is under a certain threshold, these two firms are assumed to be connected. This 
technique identifies a firm’s position in the network. When two firms rely on a similar 
production function or technology, or compete in the same product or service segment, they are 
likely to use similar vocabularies to describe their business. This textual-based measure captures 
not only firms with physical trades with each other but also firms operating in the same value 
chain. The original intent of Hoberg and Phillips is to measure competition faced by each firm. 
However, this textual-based measure also captures whether a firm’s disclosure has broad 
implications to many other firms in the economy because the degree of overlapping words 
captures the extent to which a firm’s disclosure helps investors learn about other firms. Put 
differently, well-connected firms are those operating in a highly competitive environment 
because their products or inputs are commodities or standardized services. 
    The average number of firms to which a firm connects is 82, the median is 49, the 25th 
percentile is 17, and the 75th percentile is 104 (Table 1). The serial correlation of this 
connectedness measure is 0.95. Such a high correlation may be driven by stable use of 
vocabularies in business descriptions. Note that as a firm increases its size, it is naturally 
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connected with more firms in the network. Therefore, well-connected firms, on average, are 
larger in size than less-connected firms. 
    Two broad industries have the most well-connected firms: high technology (e.g., software, 
communication equipment, biotechnology) and financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks and 
mortgage finance). For example, QuadraMed, a healthcare IT company, is paired with IDX 
Systems based on words such as patient, database, physician, and server, and Wanderlust 
Interactive, an entertainment game producer, is paired with Take Two Interactive based on words 
like royalties, video, television, and entertainment. These words describe their common 
customers, the means to collect revenue, and the resources used in their production process. 
Well-known high tech firms identified as well-connected are Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft. 
Financial institutions use many standardized contracts to create liquidity in the exchange 
markets, so they tend to use similar vocabularies in their business descriptions. For instance, 
First Niagara is paired with Burke Group based on annuities, creditworthy, pledging, and 
uncollectible. Well-known financial firms identified as well-connected are Citigroup, State 
Street, and Bank of America. 
    The degree of overlapping words captures the extent to which a firm’s disclosure helps 
investors learn about other firms. When a firm is textually connected to many other firms, 
information disclosed by this firm can be used to evaluate its connected firms. 
2.3 Definition of Bellwether Firms 
    In this study, I define bellwether firms as the intersection of being both high-macro-info and 
well-connected firms, that is, firms operating in a large cyclical industry and producing/sourcing 
commodities. Performance of these firms is highly correlated with business cycles. Inputs to 
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their production process or characteristics of their outputs are very similar to other firms in the 
economy. 
    Surprisingly, the correlation between the estimated earnings R² and the connectedness is only 
0.06, indicating that very few firms are both high-macro-info and well-connected. Most of high-
macro-info and well-connected firms are in the high technology (e.g., software, hardware, 
biotechnology) or financial sectors (e.g., commercial banks and mortgage finance). 
3. Predictability of Bellwether Firms’ Disclosures 
3.1 Empirical Design and Descriptive Statistics 
    In this section, I examine whether management earnings forecasts by bellwether firms predict 
future announced GDP growth and aggregate earnings. The prediction model is as follows: 
𝑌𝑞+𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘∆𝐸(𝑋
𝐵𝑊)𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞+𝑘 
   ∆𝐸(𝑋𝐵𝑊)𝑞 is the change in expectation of a bellwether firm’s future earnings or earnings 
forecast surprise, measured as the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in 
quarter q minus the median consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts issued during the thirty 
days prior to the announcement of this management earnings forecast. I use total assets from the 
previous quarter as the deflator. Essentially, ∆𝐸(𝑋𝐵𝑊)𝑞 reveals forward-looking information 
regarding a bellwether firm’s future performance, incremental to what the market or analysts 
already knew. I find the same results when using the lower bound of management earnings 
forecast or the mean analyst consensus to calculate surprise, or when using book values of 
equities from the previous quarter as a deflator. 
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    Bellwether firms (BW) are identified as being both high-macro-info and well-connected firms. 
High-macro-info firms are those having earnings R², generated by regressing a firm’s earnings 
on aggregate earnings based on 20 quarters of data, greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). Well-
connected firms are those connecting to more than 181 firms (the 90th percentile). High-macro-
info and well-connected firms are the intersection of the two. Low-macro-info and less-
connected firms are used in a placebo test and these firms have earnings R² lower than 0.01 (the 
10th percentile) and connect to fewer than 7 firms (the 10th percentile). 
    𝑌𝑞+𝑘 is a macroeconomic indicator for a future quarter q+k. I consider five indicators: the first-
released real GDP growth, the final-released real GDP growth, the first-released nominal GDP 
growth, the final-released nominal GDP growth, and aggregate earnings (measured as the 
seasonally-adjusted change in the sum of quarterly operating income (Compustat: OIADPQ) to 
the sum of lagged total assets). Using quarterly income before extraordinary items instead of 
operating income yields the same results. GDP growths are from real-time data research center at 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In terms of timeline for 𝑌𝑞+1, the first-released GDP 
growth for quarter q+1 is usually announced after the end of q+1 and aggregate earnings are 
announced during q+1. Since the predictor ∆𝐸(𝑋𝐵𝑊)𝑞 is based on management earnings 
forecasts issued during quarter q and analyst forecasts released before the announcement of a 
management forecast, this prediction model is not subject to look-ahead bias. 
    In the multivariate analysis, I further include these control variables (following Konchitchki 
and Patatoukas, 2014a & b): the first-released real/nominal GDP growth for quarter q 
(announced after the end of quarter q), aggregate earnings announced during quarter q, and 
twelve-month cumulative aggregate stock return (CRSP: VWRETD) up till the end of quarter q. 
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    Management earnings forecasts are from the First Call’s Corporate Issued Guidance database. 
Sample period spans from 1997Q1-2010Q4 (total 56 quarters) because CIG management 
forecasts coverage before 1997 is scarce and this database is no longer available after 2010 (see 
Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller 2013). There are 33,158 guidance events with non-missing inputs 
to calculate earnings forecast surprise (see Table 1). The mean surprise is 0.01 and the median is 
0.00, suggesting no news revealed by these management forecasts. The 10th percentile of surprise 
is -0.04 and the 90th percentile is 0.05. The average first-released real GDP growth is 2.25% and 
the average final-released real GDP growth is 1.80%. The average nominal GDP growth is about 
2% greater than the average real GDP growth, reflecting the 2% average inflation rate. The 
distribution of GDP growth is slightly skewed to the left. The average final-released numbers are 
lower than the average first-released numbers, suggesting that revisions tend to be lower. 
Aggregate earnings and twelve-month cumulative aggregate returns are distributed towards the 
left, indicating more extreme negative earnings and returns than extreme positive ones. 
3.2 Results 
    In a multivariate analysis with control variables, I examine whether bellwether firms’ 
management earnings forecast is a leading indicator of future macroeconomic trends, such as 
GDP growth and aggregate earnings in the following periods. The predicted macroeconomic 
indicator in Table 2 is real GDP growth. When the event sample includes earnings forecasts 
issued by bellwether firms in the third month of a quarter (Panels A & B), these earnings 
forecasts predict the first-released and the final-released GDP growths in the subsequent three to 
four quarters. A one standard deviation increase in bellwether firms’ earnings forecast surprise is 
associated with a decline of 30-40% of the standard deviation in the real GDP growth in the 
subsequent two quarters and then the predictive power gradually decreases over time. This 
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magnitude is greater than other predictors, such as the contemporaneous real GDP growth, 
aggregate earnings and twelve-month cumulative stock returns. The event sample for Panels C & 
D includes small bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts issued in the second or third month of a 
quarter, and these small firms have market capitalization less than $1 billion. The results present 
similar trends. Earnings forecasts by small bellwether firms predict the first-released and the 
final-released GDP growths for the future three to four quarters and the predictive power 
declines over time. These results are incremental to the evidence that aggregate earnings predict 
future real GDP growth (as in Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2014a). 
    Table 3 presents the analysis on predicting nominal GDP growth, which includes inflation and 
real GDP growth. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in bellwether firms’ earnings 
forecast surprise is associated with a decline of 30-40% of the standard deviation in the nominal 
GDP growth for the subsequent two quarters and then the predictive power gradually decreases 
over time. This magnitude is again greater than other predictors, such as the contemporaneous 
real GDP growth, aggregate earnings and twelve-month cumulative stock returns. Consistent 
results are also found when restricting events issued by only small bellwether firms. These 
findings are complements to the evidence that the largest firms’ profitability predicts future 
nominal GDP growth (as in Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2014b). 
    In addition to predicting GDP growth, I examine whether earnings forecasts by bellwether 
firms predict the subsequent aggregate earnings, i.e., predicting the market. In Table 4, I find that 
earnings forecasts by bellwether firms predict aggregate earnings in the subsequent quarters 
incremental to the contemporaneous aggregate earnings. Specifically, aggregate earnings predict 
future aggregate earnings positively, while bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts predict future 
aggregate earnings negatively. This result is not driven by multicollinearity since a similar 
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magnitude of negative predictive power is still found after excluding the contemporaneous 
aggregate earnings. A one standard deviation increase in bellwether firms’ earnings forecast 
surprise is associated with a decline of 10-25% of the standard deviation in aggregate earnings 
for the subsequent four quarters, which magnitude is smaller than those contributed by the 
contemporaneous aggregate earnings and cumulative aggregate returns. Because of seasonality 
in earnings, small bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts present strong predictive power for 
aggregate earnings in the same quarter of the subsequent year. In general, these results confirm 
the speculation by investors and academics that bellwether firms’ disclosures lead the market. 
    I further conduct several robustness tests in a univariate analysis (see Table 5). Bellwether 
firms’ management forecasts are pooled in a panel and standard errors are clustered by firm and 
quarter to account for correlations among firms and across time periods. Dependent variable is 
the first-released real GDP growth for quarter q+1. Earnings forecast surprise indicates the 
difference between management earnings forecast and analyst forecast consensus. Panel A 
examines management earnings forecasts by which group of potential bellwether firms predict 
real GDP growth announced in the subsequent quarter. In Model (1), sample includes only high-
macro-info firms, as those having earnings R² greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). Earnings 
forecasts by high-macro-info firms do not seem predicting real GDP growth (p-value = 0.55; 
adjusted R² = 0). Similarly, earnings forecasts by well-connected firms, identified as those 
connecting to more than 181 firms (the 90th percentile), do not predict real GDP growth either (p-
value = -0.76; adjusted R² = 0). However, earnings forecasts by high-macro-info and well-
connected firms (representing only 1.4% of the event sample) weakly predict real GDP growth 
(p-value = 0.19; adjusted R² = 0.004). The coefficient of -1.02 indicates that earnings forecasts 
by high-macro-info and well-connected firms predict future GDP growth negatively (see Model 
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(3) in Panel A of Table 5). Model (4) presents a placebo test and shows that earnings forecasts by 
low-macro-info and less-connected firms (representing only 0.7% of the event sample) do not 
predict future GDP growth (p-value = 0.97; adjusted R² = 0). This placebo test confirms that the 
negative and significant prediction result for high-macro-info and well-connected firms is not 
purely driven by sorting on extremes. These results confirm that only management earnings 
forecasts issued by both high-macro-info and well-connected firms predict real GDP growth in 
the subsequent quarter. 
    Then I explore whether this prediction result indeed comes from managers’ possession of 
timely macroeconomic information by analyzing the timing of bellwether firms’ earnings 
forecasts. If managers of bellwether firms obtain timely macroeconomic information through 
observing daily transactions, they are expected to possess more precise signals about the state of 
the economy towards the end of a quarter after reading more signals from many transactions. For 
an example in Illustration B, TI’s manager attributed the high level of inventory to the weaker-
than-expected demand from its customers in the PC and TV markets, but ruled out the possibility 
of over-built inventories in the supply chain. Its manager also mentioned that as time goes, he 
would gain a more complete picture over this issue. Therefore, we should expect that bellwether 
firms’ earnings forecasts issued towards the end of a quarter present greater predictive power 
than those released in the beginning of a quarter.  
    Results in Panel B of Table 5 confirm this conjecture. Bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts 
issued in the first month of a quarter (i.e., Jan., Apr., Jul., and Oct.) do not predict real GDP 
growth in the subsequent quarter (p-value = 0.74; adjusted R² = 0). As time passes, bellwether 
firms’ earnings forecasts issued in the second month of a quarter (i.e., Feb., May, Aug., and 
Nov.) weakly predict future real GDP growth (p-value = 0.14; adjusted R² = 0.02). The strongest 
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predictive power comes from forecasts issued in the last month of a quarter (Mar., Jun., Sept., 
and Dec.). The p-value is less than 0.0001 and the adjusted R² is as high as 0.13. A one standard 
deviation increase in bellwether firms’ earnings forecast surprise is associated with a decline of 
37% of the standard deviation in the first-released real GDP growth in the subsequent quarter. 
Note that 58% of bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts are issued in the first month of a quarter, 
24% in the second month, and only 18% in the third month, suggesting that most firms bundle 
their earnings forecasts with actual earnings announcements and only few firms are willing to 
provide additional mid-quarter forecasts. The placebo test in Model (4) further confirms that the 
result is driven by only bellwether firms. 
    Several prior studies use firm size to identify bellwether firms. I further examine whether this 
result is driven by only large bellwether firms. Model (1) of Panel C in Table 5 presents earnings 
forecasts by bellwether firms issued in the second or third month of a quarter, Model (2) restricts 
firm size, measured as market capitalization, to be less than $2 billion, and Model (3) further 
restricts firm size to be less than $1 billion. I find that small bellwether firms’ earnings forecasts 
have greater predictive power than large bellwether firms (p-value = 0.063, 0.014, and 0.009; 
adjusted R² = 0.02, 0.07, and 0.12 as firm size decreases). A one standard deviation increase in 
small bellwether firms’ earnings forecast surprise is associated with a decline of 37% of the 
standard deviation in the first-released real GDP growth in the subsequent quarter. 
    Earnings forecasts by small bellwether firms presenting stronger predictive power than those 
by large bellwether firms is somehow surprising. The intuition is as follows. Small cyclical firms 
are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks because they have few resources to manage these 
shocks, such as diversification or hedging instruments, than large cyclical firms. Therefore, their 
performance and disclosed forecasts are more sensitive to macroeconomic trends. Moreover, 
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small firms producing or sourcing commodities in a large industry of the economy face a low 
entry barrier and fierce competition. They are likely the late entrants or the last group imitating a 
new trend of technology developed by large leaders. For one example, when a small cell phone 
manufacturer starts producing smartphones that share similar characteristics with existing 
products in the market, smartphone penetration rate is probably approaching its high end. For 
another example, a housing bubble is at the corner when a small-town local mortgage financier 
solicits you to buy a second house because he can quickly resell your loan through securitization. 
Therefore, optimistic earnings forecasts issued by small bellwether firms predict an upcoming 
downturn in the economy, and their pessimistic earnings forecasts predict a recovery in the 
economy. 
    I try several additional tests to check how robust these results are. First, the current research 
design is pooling all bellwether firms’ events in a panel. To address the cross-sectional or cross-
event correlations, I restrict the event sample to include only one bellwether firm’s earnings 
forecast in a quarter. Specifically, I choose the last available earnings forecast issued by 
bellwether firms for each quarter. This restriction reduces the sample size to 42 forecasts by 
bellwether firms issued in the third month of a quarter and 30 forecasts by small bellwether firms 
issued in the second or third month of a quarter. In this time-series regression with standard 
errors clustered by quarters, I continue to find consistent results that these forecasts predict real 
and nominal GDP growths in the subsequent three to four quarters and predict aggregate 
earnings announced in the future four quarters. 
    Second, I try different ways to calculate earnings forecast surprise, which is currently 
measured as the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in quarter q minus the 
median consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts issued during the thirty days prior to the 
 
22 
announcement of this management earnings forecast. When using the lower bound of 
management earnings forecast or the mean analyst consensus to calculate surprise, or when using 
book values of equities from the previous quarter as a deflator, I continue to find the same 
results. I also try using quarterly income before extraordinary items instead of operating income 
to compute aggregate earnings and document the same results. 
    Lastly, when high-macro-info firms are identified by a high return R², estimated by regressing 
a firm’s return on aggregate returns based on 60 months of data (at least 24 months of data are 
required), I do not find that earnings forecasts by bellwether firms, defined as being both high-
micro-info and well-connected firms, predict future GDP growth or aggregate earnings. The 
correlation between earnings R² and return R² is 0.17. In addition to this low correlation and 
measurement issues in earnings R², these two measures seem capturing different natures of 
business or groups of firms. For example, high return R² can be due to common ownerships, i.e., 
the same group of investors holding two different firms. Ownership structure and other market 
microstructure mechanism affect return R² but may not influence earnings R². 
    In conclusion, results presented in this section suggest that forward-looking information by 
bellwether firms leads the economy and the equity market. 
4. Production of Bellwether Firms’ Disclosures 
4.1 Hypothesis 
    After presenting the usefulness of bellwether firms’ management earnings forecasts on 
predicting future GDP growth and aggregate earnings, I swift my focus to analyze whether these 
bellwether firms are willing to provide timely forward-looking information. Although bellwether 
firms’ forwarding-looking information helps investors gauge where the economy is heading, it is 
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unlikely that managers of bellwether firms care much about supplying timely information for 
macroeconomic forecasts. Assuming that bellwether firms, like all the other firms, want to 
maximize their own values, they would choose to provide timely voluntary disclosures if these 
disclosures create net benefits to the firm itself. Helping investors learn about other firms’ values 
is not going to be on top of bellwether firms’ priority. In fact, I conjecture that bellwether firms 
are reluctant to provide timely disclosures because of the substitution effect and proprietary 
costs. 
    The substitution effect means that investors can obtain useful information about bellwether 
firms from many sources (e.g., government announcements about macroeconomic trends). In 
other words, investors can either use bellwether firms’ timely disclosures to predict GDP or use 
the announced GDP to gauge the performance of bellwether firms. Consider Texas Instruments 
(TI), which produces semiconductor chips used in cell phones, PCs, TVs, and industrial 
equipment for corporations. Given its wide range of customers and the cyclical semiconductor 
business, TI is likely to be classified as a bellwether firm. Thus, when the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics announced the employment statistics, investors are able to use this information to 
update TI’s value because consumers’ demand for durable goods depends on the unemployment 
rate. Theoretical model by Marinovic and Varas (2013) predicts that firms issue less frequent 
disclosures when public announcements about the macroeconomy are substitutes for company 
disclosures. In practice, investor relations (IR) consultants recommend that firms well-
understood by investors should not issue frequent disclosures because investors already know a 
lot about these firms (Cossette, 2008). Given that bellwether firms do not care about public 
interests in forecasting macroeconomic trends as much as governments, they are less willing to 
provide timely disclosures but would rather direct their investors to follow government 
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macroeconomic announcements. Therefore, we should expect that bellwether firms issue less 
frequent disclosures than non-bellwether firms. 
    Proprietary costs may play an incremental role in bellwether firms’ reluctance to provide 
timely disclosures (Verrecchia, 1983). Recall that bellwether firms are identified as firms 
producing or sourcing commodities in a large cyclical sector of the economy. The homogeneous 
nature of outputs or inputs indicates a low entry barrier or fierce competition, which reduces 
bellwether firms’ incentive to provide timely forward-looking information. 
    Visibility is another reason bellwether firms may not find the need to supply timely 
disclosures (Bushee and Miller, 2012). Bellwether firms are usually more visible than non-
bellwether firms because they are operating in a large cyclical sector of the economy or their 
inputs and outputs share similar characteristics with many other firms in the market. These firm 
characteristics are likely to attract investors’ attention, compared to business, such as producing a 
unique product in a small industry. Therefore, bellwether firms have weaker incentives to issue 
frequent disclosures. 
    However, there are several alternative explanations. Bellwether firms may face greater 
pressures from their analysts or institutional investors because the nature of their business 
endows their forward-looking information predictive value of future macroeconomic trends. 
Releasing timely macroeconomic information may help these institutional investors or analysts 
forecast other firms although bellwether firms do not particularly care about providing 
information to help evaluate other firms in the market. In addition, bellwether firms are firms 
more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks. Investors and analysts may request bellwether firms to 
frequently update their exposures to these publicly observable macroeconomic shocks 
(Armstrong, Banerjee, and Corona, 2013). 
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    The value of information transfer provides another alternative hypothesis. Continuing with 
Texas Instruments (TI) example above, investors may use information disclosed in TI’s mid-
quarter update to learn about other firms in the market. For an example in Illustration B, TI’s 
manager attributed the high level of inventory to the weaker-than-expected demand from its 
customers in the PC and TV markets, but ruled out the possibility of over-built inventories in the 
supply chain. This information has implications for consumer durables companies and firms in 
the semiconductor supply chain, and it provides information about where the economy is 
heading. Investors, especially those holding diversified portfolios, would find TI’s mid-quarter 
update useful when evaluating other securities in their portfolios, and thus may demand that TI 
discloses more frequently. 
    This argument, that diversified investors demand disclosures of bellwether firms, is based on 
the idea of disclosure clientele (e.g., Bushee, 2004; Jung, 2013; Kalay, 2014). Van Nieuwerburgh 
and Veldkamp (2010) study the matching between investors’ information acquisition strategies 
and investment styles. They argue that investors holding concentrated portfolios are more likely 
to acquire high-cost information than investors holding diversified portfolios because it is too 
expensive to acquire costly information for every security in a diversified portfolio. Consistent 
with this conjecture, Bushee and Noe (2000) show a positive association between long-term 
diversified investors’ holdings and disclosure quality. They attribute this result to the possibility 
that diversified investors demand company disclosures because company disclosures are less 
costly than other sources of information. If diversified investors rely on company disclosures, 
especially from bellwether firms, to learn about market-wide news, we should expect that 
bellwether firms owned by many diversified investors provide more disclosures. 
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    One may wonder whether and why companies respond to investors’ demands for disclosure. 
Studies in the investor activism literature provide potential explanations. Smith (1996) and 
Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) show that firms respond to the corporate governance 
requests from large investors, such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF. Many long-term investors 
may also play a similar role to CalPERS and TIAA-CREF. For example, Capital Group (i.e., 
American Funds) is one of the largest institutional investors with over one trillion USD under 
management. It has substantial stakes in many companies, including bellwether and non-
bellwether firms. Given its large size, Capital Group is a major investor for many companies. For 
instance, Capital Group owned 18.3% of Texas Instruments as of June 2014 when summing up 
all shares held by its numerous funds. Hence, Capital Group may be able to influence the 
disclosure policy of TI. Consistent with this notion, Jung (2013) shows that disclosure practices 
spill over to firms with overlapping institutional investors. Based on these rationales, it is 
possible that bellwether firms may provide frequent disclosures when facing pressures from their 
diversified institutional investors. 
4.2 Empirical Design and Results 
    I focus on analyzing the frequency of regular management earnings forecasts because these 
regular disclosures are less likely driven by unexpected events (also argued by Rogers, Skinner, 
and Van Buskirk, 2009). My initial sample includes all CRSP-Compustat firms with non-missing 
market value and book value of equities. I rely on the First Call’s Corporate Issued Guidance 
database to identify management earnings forecasts. In each year, firms are classified into four 
groups: do not issue forecasts, provide bundled-only forecasts (defined as those issued within 
two days of actual earnings announcements), release unbundled-only forecasts (defined as those 
issued outside of the five-day earnings announcement window), and provide mid-quarter 
 
27 
forecasts in addition to quarterly bundled forecasts (see the number of firms in each group in 
Table 6 Panel A). 
    Before Regulation Fair Disclosure (effective in Oct. 2000), 25% of CRSP-Compustat firms 
issued forecasts, and 70% of forecasting firms provided 1--2 unbundled-only forecasts in a year.5 
During the post-Reg. FD period from 2001--2010, 34% of CRSP-Compustat firms issued 
forecasts, and forecasting firms chose a higher disclosure frequency, such as semiannual bundled 
forecasts, quarterly bundled forecasts, or additional mid-quarter forecasts. These forecasting 
practices also became more persistent after Reg. FD. The likelihood for a bundled-only-
forecasting practice or a mid-quarter-forecasting practice to continue in the next year is as high 
as 48% or 60%, respectively (see the transition matrix in Table 6 Panel B). Investors may assume 
these recurring disclosures are a regular policy. Moreover, companies pre-announce the dates of 
these regular disclosures (see examples in Illustration C). My final sample includes 13,570 
regular forecasting firm-years from 2001--2010, and regular forecasting firms are defined as 
those issuing bundled-only or additional mid-quarter forecasts.6 
    This empirical model aims to capture how the disclosure frequency of bellwether firms differs 
from non-bellwether firms: 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
                                                          
5 These unbundled forecasts are likely to be pre-announcement warnings motivated by litigation 
or reputation concerns (Skinner, 1994; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009). 
6 Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk (2009) also distinguish regular forecasts from sporadic 
forecasts. I find consistent results when using their identification---at least three forecasts in a 
year. Results also hold when excluding financial firms from the sample. 
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    𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the number of forecasts by firm i in year t.
7 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy 
variable for firms being both high-macro-info and well-connected firms (as defined in Section 2). 
In each year, bellwether firms are identified as those in the top 20% of the estimated 
𝑅𝑒
2 distribution and well-connected firms as those in the top 20% of the distribution of 
connectedness, which is measured as the number of firms to which a firm connects.8 Control 
variables are based on determinants of disclosure frequency from prior studies (e.g., Leftwich, 
Watts, and Zimmerman, 1981; McNichols and Manegold, 1983; Botosan and Harris, 2000; Fu, 
Kraft, and Zhang, 2012). Please refer to Illustration D for detailed descriptions and references of 
these variables. Panel C of Table 6 presents summary statistics of these variables. On average, 
regular forecasting firms (defined as firms issuing bundled-only or additional mid-quarter 
forecasts) issue 6 forecasts per year (the median is 5, the 25th percentile is 3, and the 75th 
percentile is 8). I also include year-fixed and industry-fixed (based on the SIC two-digit code) 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and I cluster standard errors by firm and year. 
    I find that, on average, bellwether firms disclose less frequently than non-bellwether firms (see 
Model (1) in Table 7). In particular, bellwether firms issue nearly one fewer forecast than non-
bellwether firms, and a one standard deviation increase in the probability of being a bellwether 
firm is associated with a decline of 30% of the standard deviation in disclosure frequency. This 
magnitude is greater than the impact from all other determinants, such as firm size, the market-
to-book ratio, the portion of peers providing forecasts and institutional ownership. Overall, this 
result suggests that bellwether firms are reluctant to provide timely disclosures potentially 
                                                          
7 In the robustness tests, I find similar results when using a dummy variable for issuing additional 
mid-quarter forecasts or when taking the logarithm transformation of the number of forecasts. 
8 In the robustness tests, I find consistent results when using the top 17% or 25% of the 𝑅𝑒
2  
distribution and the connectedness distribution to identify bellwether firms. 
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because of the substitution effect between bellwether firms’ disclosures and other public 
macroeconomic information and high proprietary costs faced by bellwether firms. 
    However, it is puzzling to observe some bellwether firms still issue management earnings 
forecasts, especially towards the end of a quarter, and these forecasts predict future GDP growth 
and aggregate earnings. One alternative explanation for why bellwether firms would issue 
frequent disclosures is the pressure from their institutional investors. In this extended empirical 
model, I further examine whether bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors issue 
more frequent disclosures than other bellwether firms: 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors for 
firm i in year t-1. Institutional investors, defined as those required to file the 13F, own 61% of 
total outstanding shares of firms in my sample (see Panel C of Table 6). (𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 ×
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the interaction term between 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 (a dummy variable) 
and institutional investor ownership. 
    I find that bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors provide more frequent 
disclosures than other bellwether firms and more frequent disclosures than other firms owned by 
many institutional investors, although the magnitude (standard coefficient = 0.02) is marginal 
(see Model (2) of Table 7). Such a small magnitude is reasonable because we do not expect that 
all bellwether firms respond to the demand from their institutional investors. Firms that aim to 
maximize their own values should weigh the costs and benefits to make their disclosure 
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decisions rather than fulfilling the need from one group of investors, especially when this 
demand does not create much value for the disclosing bellwether firm. 
    To further examine whether the demand for bellwether firms’ frequent disclosures comes from 
the diversified institutional investors, I conduct the following analysis: 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of the outstanding shares held by diversified institutional 
investors to the outstanding shares held by all institutional investors for firm i in year t-1. I use 
quasi-indexers from Bushee (1998) as a proxy for diversified investors. Quasi-indexers are 
defined as long-term institutional investors who hold a diversified portfolio. Investment horizon 
is based on quarterly portfolio turnovers and the percentage of portfolio held for two years. 
Investment diversification is based on a portfolio’s concentration or a target firm’s ownership 
concentration. The other two groups of investors are dedicated investors (defined as long-term 
concentrated investors) and transient investors (defined as short-term investors). On average, the 
quarterly portfolio turnover of transient investors is 77%, while the quarterly portfolio turnover 
of quasi-indexers or dedicated investors is only 40% (see Table 1 in Bushee and Noe, 2000). In 
addition, 21--32% of dedicated investors’ investments are in large blocks (i.e., accounting for 
more than 5% of a portfolio or in a target firm), while only 1--3% of quasi-indexers’ and 
transient investors’ investments are in large blocks. Diversified investors, on average, account 
for 63% of all institutional investors’ holdings. (𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the 
interaction term between 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 (a dummy variable) and 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1. 
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    In Model (3) of Table 7, bellwether firms owned by many diversified institutional investors do 
not present an incremental difference in disclosure frequency from other firms. The magnitude of 
the coefficient for (Bellwether × Institutional) becomes insignificant. These results may be 
driven by the poor identification of diversified institutional investors because Bushee (1998) 
directly identifies block-holders and high-frequency traders and then classifies the rest of 
institutional investors as diversified investors. Diversified investors account for 63% of overall 
institutional investors’ holdings. This identification strategy may not differentiate a diversified 
institutional investor sufficiently enough from an average institutional investor. Therefore, I fail 
to find that bellwether firms owned by many diversified institutional investors disclose 
differently from other firms. 
    To check the robustness of these results, I use exogenous shocks in an attempt to shed light on 
the potential causal effects. Following Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist (2014), 
brokerage house closures are assumed to be unexpected changes in a firm’s information 
environment. I first validate their findings that firms increase their disclosure frequencies as a 
response to negative coverage shocks in this empirical model: 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑡 equals one if a firm i experiences brokerage house closures or mergers in year t 
or t-1.9 I include year t-1 because if brokerage house closures or mergers occurred in the end of a 
year, firms’ responses in disclosure frequency are likely to be in the following year.10 I also 
                                                          
9 I thank Oded Rozenbaum for sharing this data. 
10 I find consistent results when using only brokerage house closures or mergers in year t. 
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include year-fixed and industry-fixed (based on the SIC two-digit code) effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, and I cluster standard errors by firm and year. The result in Model (1) 
of Table 8 confirms that, on average, firms increase their disclosure frequency after brokerage 
house closures or mergers, consistent with the results in Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and 
Ljungqvist (2014). 
    In this extended empirical model, I further examine the extent to which bellwether firms 
increase their disclosure frequency after exogenous coverage shocks, relative to non-bellwether 
firms: 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 × 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    I find that bellwether firms increase fewer disclosures than non-bellwether firms when they 
respond to these coverage shocks; however, the difference in reaction between bellwether firms 
and non-bellwether firms is weak (p-value = 0.11 in Model (2) of Table 8). This result is 
consistent with the earlier finding that bellwether firms disclose less frequently than non-
bellwether firm. Because investors can learn about bellwether firms from many other sources, 
the loss in analyst coverage does not have a significant impact on bellwether firms’ information 
environments. Therefore, bellwether firms do not react to these shocks by increasing their 
disclosure frequencies. 
    Then I restrict the sample to include only bellwether firms and examine whether bellwether 
firms react to exogenous coverage shocks differently when they face different levels of pressures 
from their institutional investors in the following model: 
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𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    Results in Model (3) of Table 8 show that bellwether firms owned by many institutional 
investors significantly increase their disclosure frequencies after brokerage house closures, but 
other bellwether firms do not increase their disclosure frequencies after brokerage house 
closures. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that bellwether firms provide timely 
disclosures when they face pressures from their institutional investors. Institutional investors 
gather information from both analysts and company disclosures. When a bellwether firm loses its 
analyst coverage, its institutional investors may demand more company disclosures. 
    In a sample that includes only bellwether firms, I further examine whether the demand for 
bellwether firms’ frequent disclosures comes from diversified institutional investors in the 
following empirical model: 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of the outstanding shares held by diversified institutional 
investors to the outstanding shares held by all institutional investors for firm i in year t-1. 
(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the interaction term between 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑡 (a dummy 
variable) and 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1. In Model (4) of Table (8), I fail to find that bellwether firms 
owned by many diversified institutional investors change their disclosure policy differently from 
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other firms. Bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors continue showing a 
significant increase in their disclosure frequencies. 
    In summary, results in both the association setting and the exogenous setting present robust 
evidence that bellwether firms, on average, disclose less frequently than non-bellwether firms. 
However, bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors disclose more frequently than 
other bellwether firms. 
5. Conclusions 
    This study provides robust evidence that forward-looking information by bellwether firms 
predicts GDP growth and aggregate earnings in the subsequent quarters. It also shows that 
bellwether firms, on average, disclose less frequently than non-bellwether firms, but that 
bellwether firms owned by many institutional investors disclose more frequently than other 
bellwether firms. These results suggest that although bellwether firms’ timely disclosures are 
useful in predicting macroeconomic trends, these firms are reluctant to provide these timely 
disclosures unless they face pressures from their institutional investors. It is because investors 
can either use bellwether firms’ timely disclosures to predict GDP or use the announced GDP to 
gauge the performance of bellwether firms. Since providing disclosures incurs preparation and 
proprietary costs, bellwether firms are not willing to issue frequent disclosures. 
    More broadly, this paper demonstrates that the nature of business determines the type of 
information (i.e., firm-specific information vs. common information) endowed with a firm’s 
managers. When a firm produces or sources commodities in a large cyclical sector of the 
economy, its disclosures are likely to have macroeconomic content and provide implications for 
many other firms in the market. This notion is similar to the research question explored by 
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Hutton, Lee, and Shu (2012). They analyze how different natures of business affect the 
information sets faced by managers and analysts. 
    This study also provides implications for policy makers and academic researchers. Without 
mandatory disclosure requirements, some bellwether firms voluntarily provide frequent 
disclosures that potentially serve as a valuable public good. That is, these frequent disclosures 
may be beneficial to investors who do not have a direct stake in these bellwether firms because 
they can use the disclosed information to evaluate other firms in the market. It remains debatable 
whether the market needs all bellwether firms or only one bellwether firm to disclose since they 




Illustration A: High-macro-info Industries 
High-macro-info industries are identified by the number of member firms having an earnings R² 
greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). Industries with the most high earnings R2 firms are listed 
as the first for a year, the second most high earnings R2 firms are listed as the second for a year, 
etc... Earnings R2 is estimated by regressing a firm’s earnings on aggregate earnings using 





1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Chemicals Metals & Mining Chemicals Machinery Health Care Equipment & 
Supplies
Health Care Equipment & 
Supplies
Thrifts & Mortgage 
Finance
Metals & Mining Insurance Software
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels
Machinery Biotechnology Health Care Equipment & 
Supplies
Biotechnology
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Insurance Computers & Peripherals Communications 
Equipment
Biotechnology Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment
Health Care Equipment & 
Supplies












Internet Software & 
Services
Internet Software & 
Services
Insurance




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Insurance Software Internet, software, 
services
Media capital markets
Internet Software & 
Services
Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels














Software Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment
Commercial Banks Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels
Commercial Banks
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs)
Commercial Banks Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment
Commercial Banks Oil, Gas & Consumable 
Fuels




Illustration B: Example of Information Content in Bellwether Firms’ Disclosures  
 
From Texas Instruments 2010 Q3 Mid-quarter Management Forecast Conference Call Transcript 
<Q – Tristan Gerra>: Quick one. Are you willing to give us an update on the inventory trends 
directionally, specifically for what you have in consignment?  
<A – Ron Slaymaker>: That’s a very detailed question that I wouldn’t even venture to start 
down on. I don’t know that I even typically have that detail at the end of the quarter. But I’ll 
make some general comments on inventory. Some I can maybe be of use and others I may not at 
this point in the quarter.  
Let me first of all just talk about inventory trends, maybe at customers. So I think if you look at 
some of the areas that I already identified, specifically consumer TVs and PCs, and PCs again 
including associated hard disk drives. In fact, we’re seeing an inventory adjustment that really 
tie[s] to weaker-than-expected end demand by our customers for their products. I think the PC 
market has a history of sharp, but relatively quick corrections and we believe that, in fact, is 
what we’re in.  
For TVs, I think the correction really ties to lower-than-expected flat screen demand that was 
associated with the World Cup, as well as what I would characterize as tepid consumer 
acceptance of some of the new 3D television models. But in both markets I think those 
adjustments are resulting from lower-than-expected demand and not from an excessive build 
of semiconductor components. I think in terms of our own inventory trends, which is part of 
what you were asking with respect to consignment, I don’t have a projection on our trends at this 
point in the quarter. Again, we’ll have those details for you in October.  
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Maybe the only other one I can comment on would be distribution and just in general, 
distribution is tracking our overall results pretty closely. And I say that both from the 
standpoint of resales or sales out of that channel, as well as our shipments in. So with respect 
to distribution inventory, it’s been managed very lean, partly because of the structural benefit of 
the consignment program that we’ve referenced and we really see that we would characterize 













Illustration D: Definitions for Variables Used in Tables 7-8 Propensity Analysis 
  
Variable Definition Source Reference
Forecast frequency the number of management earnings forecasts issued in 
a year
First Call
High-macro-info firm equals one if a firm is in the top 20% of the R
2 
distribution estimated by regressing a firm's earnings on 
aggregate earnings using twenty quarters of data (at least 
ten quarters are required). Earnings are quarterly income 
before extraordinary items deflated by the beginning 
market capitalization. Aggregate earnings are the sum of 
all Compustat firms' quarterly income before 
extraordinary items divided by the sum of all Compustat 
firms' beginning market capitalization.
CRSP, Compustat Bonsall, Bozanic, and 
Fischer (2013)
Well-connected firm equals one if a firm is in the top 20% of the distribution 
of connectedness, which is measured as the number of 
firms to which a firm connects.
Hoberg and Phillips 
Library
Aobdia, Caskey, and 
Ozel (2014)
Bellwether firm equals one for firms being both high-macro-info and 
well-connected firms.
Size the natural logarithm of market capitalization. CRSP Leftwich, Watts, and 
Zimmerman (1981)




the book value of property, plant, and equipment 
deflated by the beginning total assets.
Compustat Leftwich, Watts, and 
Zimmerman (1981)
Leverage the book value of long-term debt divided by the 
beginning total assets.
Compustat Leftwich, Watts, and 
Zimmerman (1981)
Return-on-assets income before extraordinary items divided by the 
beginning total assets.
Compustat McNichols and 
Manegold (1983)
Portion of peers 
forecasting
the sales-weighted portion of firms providing 
management forecasts in a SIC four-digit industry.
First Call, Compustat Botosan and Harris 
(2000)
Herfindahl index based on the SIC three-digit industry. Compustat Botosan and Harris 
(2000)
NYSE firm equals one for firms listed on NYSE. Compustat Leftwich, Watts, and 
Zimmerman (1981)




the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional 
investors, defined as those required to file the 13F.
Thomson Reuters, 
CRSP
Bushee and Noe (2000)
Intensity of investor 
activism
the natural logarithm of the number of 13D filings in a 
year. 
Audit Analytics
Number of analysts 
following
the natural logarithm of the average number of analysts 
in a year.




the average of daily standard deviations of analyst 
forecasts in a year.
IBES Botosan and Harris 
(2000)
Number of public 
offerings
the natural logarithm of the number of public equity and 
debt issuances in a year.
Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum
Botosan and Harris 
(2000)
Number of M&A deals the natural logarithm of the number of M&A 
transactions in a year.
Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum




Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Prediction Analysis  
There are 33,158 guidance events with non-missing inputs to calculate earnings forecast surprise 
during the sample period from 1997Q1-2010Q4 (total 56 quarters). Management earnings 
forecasts are from the First Call’s Corporate Issued Guidance database. GDP growths are from 
real-time data research center at Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Earnings forecast 
surprise is measured as the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in quarter q 
minus the median consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts issued during the thirty days prior to 
the announcement of this management earnings forecast. Aggregate earnings are the seasonally-
adjusted changes in the sum of quarterly operating income (Compustat: OIADPQ) to the sum of 
lagged total assets. Twelve-month cumulative aggregate stock return (CRSP: VWRETD) is up 
till the end of quarter q. Earnings R2 is estimated by regressing a firm’s earnings on aggregate 
earnings using twenty quarters of data prior to quarter q. The number of firms to which a firm 













First released real GDP growth for q+1 33,158 2.25 -0.25 1.12 2.46 3.53 4.82 2.46
Final released real GDP growth for q+1 33,158 1.80 -1.91 0.36 2.30 3.69 4.76 2.89
First released nominal GDP growth for q+1 33,158 4.20 1.78 3.37 4.26 5.95 6.76 2.66
Final released nominal GDP growth for q+1 33,158 3.94 -0.46 3.18 4.63 5.77 7.32 3.35
Aggregate earnings growth for q+1 33,158 0.15 -0.23 -0.05 0.21 0.27 0.39 0.30
Earnings R
2 33,158 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.29 0.12
Number of connected firms 33,158 82 7 17 49 104 181 105
Earnings forecast surprise 33,158 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 2.51






Table 2: Multivariate Analysis on Whether Bellwether Firms’ Earnings Forecasts Predict Future Real GDP Growth 
Dependent variable is the first-released or final-released real GDP growth for quarter q+1, q+2 q+3, or q+4. Earnings forecast surprise 
is the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in quarter q minus the median consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
issued during the thirty days prior to the announcement of this management earnings forecast. Control variables are the first-released 
real GDP growth for quarter q (announced after the end of quarter q), aggregate earnings announced during quarter q, and twelve-
month cumulative aggregate stock return (CRSP: VWRETD) up till the end of quarter q. The event sample for Panels A and B 
includes management earnings forecasts by high-macro-info and well-connected firms issued in the third month of a calendar quarter. 
The event sample for Panels C and D includes management earnings forecasts by small high-macro-info and well-connected firms 
issued in the second or third months of a calendar quarter and these small bellwether firms have their market capitalization less than 
$1 billion. Bellwether firms’ management forecasts are pooled in a panel and standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter to 
account for correlations among firms and across time periods. The sample period spans from 1997Q1-2010Q4. High-macro-info firms 
are those having an earnings R² greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). Well-connected firms are those connecting to more than 181 
firms (the 90th percentile). High-macro-info and well-connected firms are the intersection of the two. Market capitalization is the 









Months: Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -1.72 <.0001 -0.33 -2.57 <.0001 -0.41 -0.86 <.0001 -0.14 0.47 0.02 0.08
First real GDP growth for q 0.08 0.56 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.39 0.05 0.36
Aggregate earnings growth q -0.86 0.30 -0.12 1.02 0.41 0.12 -0.03 0.98 0.00 2.39 0.03 0.27
12-month aggregate return 1.95 0.07 0.21 -2.23 0.34 -0.21 2.62 0.17 0.25 -5.21 0.01 -0.48
Intercept 2.47 <.0001 2.24 <.0001 2.30 0.00 1.09 0.13
N 85 85 85 85
Adj. R
2 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.07
Panel B
Sample firms:
Months: Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -2.83 <.0001 -0.39 -2.21 <.0001 -0.29 -0.62 0.01 -0.08 0.19 0.82 0.01
First real GDP growth for q 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.37 0.09 0.22 0.29 0.17 0.05 0.81 0.43
Aggregate earnings growth q 0.80 0.29 0.08 2.39 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.95 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.07
12-month aggregate return 0.71 0.62 0.06 -1.80 0.49 -0.14 0.67 0.77 0.05 0.73 0.51 -0.45
Intercept 1.77 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.55 0.04 -5.95 0.01
N 85 85 85 85
Adj. R
2 0.22 0.09 0.01 0.08
High-macro-info and well-connected firm
High-macro-info and well-connected firm
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+1
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+2
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+3
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+4
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
First released real GDP 
growth for q+1
First released real GDP 
growth for q+2
First released real GDP 
growth for q+3











Months: excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -1.10 0.05 -0.28 -1.98 0.00 -0.40 -0.75 0.09 -0.16 0.35 0.12 0.11
First real GDP growth for q 0.29 <.0001 0.39 0.10 0.39 0.11 -0.24 0.01 -0.27 0.08 0.35 0.13
Aggregate earnings growth q -0.12 0.86 -0.02 -0.49 0.76 -0.07 -1.84 0.07 -0.29 -0.92 0.29 -0.22
12-month aggregate return 0.64 0.62 0.08 0.28 0.93 0.03 4.84 0.03 0.53 0.66 0.69 0.11
Intercept 1.73 <.0001 2.61 <.0001 3.53 <.0001 2.39 <.0001
N 53 53 53 53
Adj. R
2 0.26 0.12 0.04 -0.04
Panel D
Sample firms:
Months: excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -2.26 0.00 -0.41 -1.51 0.03 -0.25 -0.59 0.08 -0.13 -0.15 0.48 -0.04
First real GDP growth for q 0.23 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.88 0.02 -0.13 0.20 -0.15 0.29 0.00 0.37
Aggregate earnings growth q 0.93 0.31 0.12 1.10 0.53 0.13 -2.17 0.11 -0.34 -2.59 0.01 -0.46
12-month aggregate return 1.28 0.50 0.12 1.15 0.75 0.10 4.62 0.10 0.51 -0.94 0.53 -0.12
Intercept 1.69 <.0001 1.92 <.0001 2.95 <.0001 1.85 <.0001
N 53 53 53 53
Adj. R
2 0.35 0.06 0.02 0.17
High-macro-info and well-connected firm with market cap. < 1 billion
High-macro-info and well-connected firm with market cap. < 1 billion
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+1
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+2
Final released real GDP 
growth for q+3
Final released real GDP growth 
for q+4
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
First released real GDP 
growth for q+1
First released real GDP 
growth for q+2
First released real GDP 
growth for q+3









Table 3: Multivariate Analysis on Whether Bellwether Firms’ Earnings Forecasts Predict Nominal GDP Growth 
Dependent variable is the first-released or final-released nominal GDP growth for quarter q+1, q+2 q+3, or q+4. Earnings forecast 
surprise is the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in quarter q minus the median consensus of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts issued during the thirty days prior to the announcement of this management earnings forecast. Control variables are the first-
released nominal GDP growth for quarter q (announced after the end of quarter q), aggregate earnings announced during quarter q, 
and twelve-month cumulative aggregate stock return (CRSP: VWRETD) up till the end of quarter q. The event sample for Panels A 
and B includes management earnings forecasts by high-macro-info and well-connected firms issued in the third month of a calendar 
quarter. The event sample for Panels C and D includes management earnings forecasts by small high-macro-info and well-connected 
firms issued in the second or third months of a calendar quarter and these small bellwether firms have their market capitalization less 
than $1 billion. Bellwether firms’ management forecasts are pooled in a panel and standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter to 
account for correlations among firms and across time periods. The sample period spans from 1997Q1-2010Q4. High-macro-info firms 
are those having an earnings R² greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). Well-connected firms are those connecting to more than 181 
firms (the 90th percentile). High-macro-info and well-connected firms are the intersection of the two. Market capitalization is the 









Months: Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -2.26 <.0001 -0.38 -2.34 <.0001 -0.35 -1.31 <.0001 -0.20 -0.04 0.82 -0.01
First nominal GDP growth q 0.10 0.37 0.11 0.28 0.01 0.26 0.10 0.37 0.09 0.46 <.0001 0.41
Aggregate earnings growth q -0.70 0.45 -0.08 2.02 0.08 0.21 -1.03 0.39 -0.11 1.27 0.19 0.13
12-month aggregate return 3.36 0.01 0.32 -2.12 0.29 -0.18 3.40 0.04 0.30 -3.08 0.04 -0.25
Intercept 4.15 <.0001 3.33 <.0001 3.85 <.0001 1.98 0.01
N 85 85 85 85
Adj. R
2 0.27 0.17 0.11 0.09
Panel B
Sample firms:
Months: Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -3.37 <.0001 -0.44 -2.58 <.0001 -0.31 -1.46 <.0001 -0.18 -0.95 <.0001 -0.11
First nominal GDP growth q 0.28 0.01 0.23 0.25 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.10 0.61 <.0001 0.43
Aggregate earnings growth q 0.83 0.27 0.08 2.98 0.03 0.26 0.01 1.00 0.00 -0.26 0.80 -0.02
12-month aggregate return 1.80 0.10 0.14 -1.58 0.52 -0.11 2.51 0.20 0.18 -4.25 0.02 -0.28
Intercept 3.30 <.0001 2.98 <.0001 3.59 <.0001 1.21 0.15
N 85 85 85 85
Adj. R
2 0.35 0.16 0.07 0.10
High-macro-info and well-connected firm
Final released nominal GDP 
growth q+1
Final released nominal GDP 
growth q+2
Final released nominal 
GDP growth q+3
Final released nominal 
GDP growth q+4
Model (3) Model (4)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
High-macro-info and well-connected firm
Model (1) Model (2)
First released nominal GDP 
growth q+1
First released nominal GDP 
growth q+2
First released nominal GDP 
growth q+3










Months: excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -1.57 0.04 -0.33 -1.58 0.03 -0.27 -1.19 0.02 -0.26 0.14 0.62 0.04
First nominal GDP growth q 0.26 0.02 0.30 0.26 0.04 0.24 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.31
Aggregate earnings growth q -0.61 0.54 -0.09 -0.23 0.89 -0.03 -2.69 0.00 -0.42 -0.95 0.40 -0.19
12-month aggregate return 2.80 0.10 0.30 1.27 0.71 0.11 2.68 0.07 0.30 1.10 0.59 0.15
Intercept 3.21 <.0001 3.42 <.0001 4.49 <.0001 3.57 <.0001
N 53 53 53 53
Adj. R
2 0.33 0.12 0.11 0.05
Panel D
Sample firms:
Months: excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -2.48 0.01 -0.40 -1.72 0.03 -0.24 -1.17 0.02 -0.22 -0.78 0.05 -0.16
First nominal GDP growth q 0.33 0.00 0.29 0.31 0.01 0.24 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.40 <.0001 0.44
Aggregate earnings growth q 0.47 0.62 0.05 0.99 0.59 0.10 -2.23 0.10 -0.31 -3.10 0.01 -0.45
12-month aggregate return 3.23 0.06 0.27 1.42 0.69 0.10 4.49 0.08 0.44 0.10 0.96 0.01
Intercept 2.90 <.0001 2.86 <.0001 4.69 <.0001 3.12 <.0001
N 53 53 53 53
Adj. R
2 0.46 0.16 0.09 0.21
High-macro-info and well-connected firm with market cap. < 1 billion
High-macro-info and well-connected firm with market cap. < 1 billion
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Final released nominal 
GDP growth q+1
Final released nominal 
GDP growth q+2
Final released nominal 
GDP growth q+3
Final released nominal GDP 
growth q+4
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
First released nominal GDP 
growth q+1
First released nominal GDP 
growth q+2
First released nominal GDP 
growth q+3








Table 4: Multivariate Analysis on Whether Bellwether Firms’ Earnings Forecasts Predict Aggregate Earnings  
Dependent variable is aggregate earnings growth, measured as the seasonally-adjusted change in the sum of quarterly operating 
income (Compustat: OIADPQ) to the sum of lagged total assets), announced in quarter q+1, q+2 q+3, or q+4. Earnings forecast 
surprise is the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in quarter q minus the median consensus of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts issued during the thirty days prior to the announcement of this management earnings forecast. Control variables are the first-
released nominal GDP growth for quarter q (announced after the end of quarter q), aggregate earnings announced during quarter q, 
and twelve-month cumulative aggregate stock return (CRSP: VWRETD) up till the end of quarter q. The event sample for Panels A 
and B includes management earnings forecasts by high-macro-info and well-connected firms issued in the third month of a calendar 
quarter. The event sample for Panels C and D includes management earnings forecasts by small high-macro-info and well-connected 
firms issued in the second or third months of a calendar quarter and these small bellwether firms have their market capitalization less 
than $1 billion. Bellwether firms’ management forecasts are pooled in a panel and standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter to 
account for correlations among firms and across time periods. The sample period spans from 1997Q1-2010Q4. High-macro-info firms 
are those having an earnings R² greater than 0.29 (the 90th percentile). Well-connected firms are those connecting to more than 181 
firms (the 90th percentile). High-macro-info and well-connected firms are the intersection of the two. Market capitalization is the 











Months: Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -0.06 <.0001 -0.08 -0.19 <.0001 -0.24 -0.14 <.0001 -0.18 -0.13 <.0001 -0.16
First nominal GDP growth q 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.35 0.08 0.02 0.36 0.11 -0.01 0.81 -0.04
Aggregate earnings growth q 0.55 <.0001 0.55 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.37 0.11 -0.11 0.41 -0.11
12-month aggregate return 0.27 0.06 0.19 0.54 0.00 0.38 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.09 0.29
Intercept -0.10 0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.10 0.06 -0.07 0.36
N 85 85 85 85
Adj. R
2 0.67 0.44 0.14 0.04
Panel B
Sample firms:
Months: Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -0.08 <.0001 -0.10 -0.20 <.0001 -0.25 -0.15 <.0001 -0.18 -0.13 <.0001 -0.16
First nominal GDP growth q 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.44 0.07 0.01 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.86 -0.03
Aggregate earnings growth q
12-month aggregate return 0.76 <.0001 0.55 0.72 <.0001 0.52 0.36 0.05 0.26 0.30 0.10 0.22
Intercept -0.16 0.00 -0.16 <.0001 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.50
N 85 85 85 85
Adj. R
2 0.48 0.42 0.14 0.04
High-macro-info and well-connected firm
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+1
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+2
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+3
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+4
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+1
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+2
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+3
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+4
High-macro-info and well-connected firm










Months: excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.16 0.00 -0.24 -0.11 0.08 -0.18 -0.14 0.00 -0.27
First nominal GDP growth q 0.01 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.64 -0.03 -0.01 0.68 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.41
Aggregate earnings growth q 0.57 <.0001 0.56 0.43 <.0001 0.45 0.27 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.78 0.04
12-month aggregate return 0.42 0.01 0.31 0.45 0.00 0.36 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.38 0.05 0.37
Intercept -0.03 0.52 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.91 0.11 0.05
N 53 53 53 53
Adj. R
2 0.76 0.66 0.23 0.12
Panel D
Sample firms:
Months: excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Dependent variable:
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -0.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.15 0.00 -0.23 -0.10 0.12 -0.17 -0.14 0.00 -0.27
First nominal GDP growth q 0.01 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.80 0.02 0.00 0.87 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.41
Aggregate earnings growth q
12-month aggregate return 0.94 <.0001 0.70 0.84 <.0001 0.68 0.54 0.01 0.45 0.41 0.01 0.40
Intercept -0.14 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.06 0.28 0.10 0.09
N 53 53 53 53
Adj. R
2 0.63 0.57 0.21 0.14
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+1
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+2
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+3
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+4
High-macro-info and well-connected firm with market cap. < 1 billion
High-macro-info and well-connected firm with market cap. < 1 billion
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+1
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+2
Aggregate earnings growth 
announced in q+3




Table 5: Univariate Analysis on Whether Bellwether Firms’ Earnings Forecasts 
Predict Future Real GDP Growth  
Dependent variable is the first-released real GDP growth for quarter q+1. Earnings forecast 
surprise is measured as the midpoint of management earnings forecast announced in quarter q 
minus the median consensus of analysts’ earnings forecasts issued during the thirty days prior to 
the announcement of this management earnings forecast. Bellwether firms’ management 
forecasts are pooled in a panel and standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter to account 
for correlations among firms and across time periods. The sample period spans from 1997Q1-
2010Q4. High-macro-info firms are those having an earnings R² greater than 0.29 (the 90th 
percentile). Well-connected firms are those connecting to more than 181 firms (the 90th 
percentile). High-macro-info and well-connected firms are the intersection of the two. Market 





Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise 0.33 0.55 0.02 0.00 -0.76 -0.01 -1.02 0.19 -0.08 -0.04 0.97 0.00
Intercept 2.26 <.0001 2.27 <.0001 2.26 <.0001 2.59 <.0001
N 3,380 10% 3,800 11% 465 0.014 241 0.0073
Adj. R




Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise 1.75 0.74 0.03 2.75 0.14 0.17 -1.94 <.0001 -0.37 1.95 0.76 0.06
Intercept 2.15 <.0001 2.16 <.0001 2.70 <.0001 2.50 <.0001
N 269 111 85 41
Adj. R






Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Earnings forecast surprise -1.22 0.063 -0.15 -1.37 0.014 -0.28 -1.45 0.009 -0.37 3.58 0.256 0.19
Intercept 2.43 <.0001 2.44 <.0001 2.69 <.0001 3.16 <.0001
N 196 69 53 37
Adj. R




Twelve months in a year Twelve months in a year Twelve months in a year
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
High-macro-info firm Well-connected firm
High-macro-info AND 
well-connected firm







Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct Feb, May, Aug, and Nov Mar, Jun, Sept, and Dec







No Market cap. < 2 billion Market cap. < 1 billion
excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct excl. Jan, Apr, Jul, and Oct
Market cap. < 1 billion










Table 6: Disclosure Practices and Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the 
Propensity Analysis 
“No forecasts” means that a firm does not issue any management earnings forecasts in a year. 
“Unbundled only” means that a firm issues only unbundled forecasts, defined as those issued 
outside of the five-day earnings announcement window. “Bundled only” means that a firm issues 
only bundled forecasts, defined as those issued within two days of its actual earnings 
announcements. “Additional mid-quarter” means that a firm issues mid-quarter forecasts in 
addition to its quarterly bundled forecasts. The initial sample includes all CRSP-Compustat firms 
that are not missing book values or market values of equities.  
Panel A: Number of firms by disclosure practices and the initial sample 
 
 
Panel B: Transition matrix 
  
No forecasts Unbundled only Bundled only Add mid-quarter
1997 4,717 825 112 102 5,756
1998 4,299 1,142 137 229 5,807
1999 4,010 1,063 241 315 5,629
2000 3,834 931 271 372 5,408
2001 3,247 733 405 897 5,282
2002 3,276 531 544 890 5,241
2003 3,215 384 625 824 5,048
2004 3,049 268 680 906 4,903
2005 3,070 204 644 787 4,705
2006 2,964 174 732 779 4,649
2007 2,969 117 708 690 4,484
2008 3,005 91 566 691 4,353
2009 3,124 96 554 543 4,317
2010 2,949 78 587 518 4,132
Number of firms by disclosure practices
CRSP-Compustat 
firms with non-missing 
BVE and MVE
Pre Reg FD (1996-2000)
No forecasts Unbundled only Bundled only Add mid-quarter
No forecasts 85% 11% 2% 2%
Unbundled only 47% 38% 5% 10%
Bundled only 44% 24% 16% 16%
Add mid-quarter 23% 30% 13% 33%
Post Reg FD (2001-2010)
No forecasts Unbundled only Bundled only Add mid-quarter
No forecasts 92% 3% 3% 2%
Unbundled only 43% 30% 10% 18%
Bundled only 17% 3% 48% 32%













Panel C: Summary statistics of variables used in the propensity analysis 
Final sample includes regular forecasting firms, defined as firms issuing bundled-only forecasts 
or firms issuing additional mid-quarter forecasts for the period 2001-2010. Forecast frequency is 
the number of management earnings forecasts in a year. Earnings R2 is estimated by regressing a 
firm’s earnings on aggregate earnings using twenty quarters of data. Connectedness is measured 












Regular forecast frequency 13,570 6.04 3.00 5.00 8.00 4.21
Earnings R
2 13,570 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.12
Number of connected firms 13,570 83 15 46 103 112
Size 13,570 6.96 5.83 6.88 8.04 1.72
Market-to-book 13,570 0.78 0.29 0.74 1.22 0.79
Property, plant, equipment 13,570 0.21 0.05 0.14 0.30 0.21
Leverage 13,570 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.29 0.17
Return-on-assets 13,570 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.20
Portion of peers forecasting 13,570 0.71 0.57 0.79 0.92 0.26
Herfindahl index 13,570 0.17 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.16
NYSE firm 13,570 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
Dividend paying firm 13,570 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
Institutional investor holdings 13,570 0.61 0.42 0.69 0.86 0.31
Intensity of investor activism 13,570 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36
Number of analysts following 13,570 1.53 0.76 1.67 2.29 0.97
Analyst forecast dispersion 13,570 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05
Number of public offerings 13,570 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31
Number of M&A deals 13,570 0.80 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.39
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Table 7: The Propensity to Issue Frequent Forecasts  
Final sample includes regular forecasting firms, defined as firms issuing bundled-only forecasts 
or firms issuing additional mid-quarter forecasts for the period 2001-2010. The dependent 
variable is disclosure frequency, measured as the number of management earnings forecasts. 
High-macro-info firms are those in the top 20% of the R2 distribution—estimated by regressing a 
firm’s earnings on aggregate earnings using twenty quarters of data. Well-connected firms are 
those in the top 20% of the distribution of connectedness, which is measured as the number of 
firms to which a firm connects. Bellwether firms are those being both high-macro-info and well-
connected firms. Institutional investor ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by 
institutional investors, defined as those required to file the 13F. Diversified institutional investor 
holdings is the ratio of the outstanding shares held by diversified institutional investors to the 
outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. “Std. Coeff.” stands for 
standardized coefficient. Please refer to Appendix D for detailed variable definitions.  
 
 
Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Bellwether firm -0.90 <.0001 -0.30 -0.91 <.0001 -0.30 -0.87 <.0001 -0.29
Bellwether firm    Inst. investor holdings 0.52 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.50 0.01
Bellwether firm    Diversified inst. Investor 0.26 0.28 0.01
Size 0.46 <.0001 0.19 0.45 <.0001 0.19 0.34 <.0001 0.14
Market-to-book 0.26 <.0001 0.06 0.26 <.0001 0.06 0.23 <.0001 0.06
Property, plant, equipment 0.54 <.0001 0.05 0.54 <.0001 0.04 0.55 <.0001 0.05
Leverage 0.71 <.0001 0.04 0.73 <.0001 0.04 0.74 0.00 0.04
Return-on-assets 0.71 0.00 0.04 0.71 0.00 0.04 0.74 0.00 0.03
Portion of peers forecasting 1.26 <.0001 0.08 1.26 <.0001 0.08 1.33 <.0001 0.08
Herfindahl index 0.35 0.06 0.01 0.35 0.05 0.01 0.20 0.32 0.01
NYSE firm 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.04
Dividend paying firm -0.04 0.59 0.00 -0.04 0.63 0.00 0.03 0.67 0.00
Institutional investor holdings 0.93 <.0001 0.08 0.91 <.0001 0.08 1.02 <.0001 0.08
Intensity of investor activism -0.11 0.23 -0.01 -0.11 0.23 -0.01 -0.09 0.35 -0.01
Number of analysts following 0.06 0.27 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.01 0.29 <.0001 0.06
Analyst forecast dispersion -3.59 <.0001 -0.04 -3.62 <.0001 -0.04 -3.49 <.0001 -0.04
Number of public offerings -0.12 0.31 -0.01 -0.12 0.30 -0.01 -0.09 0.46 -0.01
Number of M&A deals 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.11 <.0001 0.04
Diversified inst. investor holdings -0.18 0.38 -0.01
N 13,570 13,570 13,570
Adj. R
2 0.1892 0.1894 0.1851
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
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Table 8: Changes in Forecast Frequency after Exogenous Coverage Shocks  
If a firm suffers exogenous analyst coverage terminations as a result of brokerage closures or 
mergers in year t or t-1, “exogenous coverage shock” equals one. The dependent variable is 
disclosure frequency, measured as the number of management earnings forecasts. The sample 
used for Models (1) and (2) includes regular forecasting firms, defined as firms issuing bundled-
only forecasts or firms issuing additional mid-quarter forecasts for the period 2001-2010. The 
sample used for Model (3) is restricted to only bellwether firms. Bellwether firms are those being 
both high-macro-info and well-connected firms. High-macro-info firms are those in the top 20% 
of the R2 distribution—estimated by regressing a firm’s earnings on aggregate earnings using 
twenty quarters of data, and well-connected firms are those in the top 20% of the distribution of 
connectedness, which is measured as the number of firms to which a firm connects. Institutional 
investor ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors, defined 
as those required to file the 13F. Diversified institutional investor holdings is the ratio of the 
outstanding shares held by diversified institutional investors to the outstanding shares held by all 
institutional investors. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. “Std. Coeff.” stands for standardized coefficient. Please refer to 




Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff. Coeff. P-valueStd. Coeff. Coeff. P-value Std. Coeff.
Shock 0.49 <.0001 0.05 0.51 <.0001 0.05 -0.32 0.73 -0.05 0.23 0.52 0.09
Shock    Bellwether firms -0.71 0.11 -0.01
Shock    Inst. investor holdings 2.72 0.07 0.30 3.14 0.05 0.36
Shock    Diversified inst. Investor -1.16 0.45 -0.13
Bellwether firms -0.90 0.00 -0.03
Size 0.50 <.0001 0.19 0.51 <.0001 0.19 0.10 0.61 0.06 0.34 0.17 0.23
Market-to-book 0.35 <.0001 0.06 0.36 <.0001 0.06 -0.11 0.70 -0.03 0.04 0.90 0.01
Property, plant, equipment 0.08 0.81 0.00 0.06 0.85 0.00 -1.26 0.63 -0.03 0.11 0.95 0.00
Leverage 1.63 <.0001 0.05 1.60 <.0001 0.05 -1.17 0.42 -0.05 -1.18 0.36 -0.07
Return-on-assets 0.93 <.0001 0.03 0.87 0.00 0.03 2.17 0.10 0.13 1.55 0.26 0.14
Portion of peers forecasting 1.50 <.0001 0.08 1.49 <.0001 0.08 0.07 0.96 0.00 1.14 0.39 0.10
Herfindahl index -1.38 <.0001 -0.05 -1.40 <.0001 -0.05 1.16 0.73 0.04 0.59 0.77 0.02
NYSE firm 0.38 <.0001 0.04 0.37 0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.92 -0.01 0.05 0.94 0.01
Dividend paying firm 0.00 0.98 0.00 -0.01 0.95 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00 -1.11 0.24 -0.19
Institutional investor holdings 1.82 <.0001 0.12 1.80 <.0001 0.12 0.42 0.69 0.04 0.13 0.91 0.01
Intensity of investor activism -0.22 0.02 -0.02 -0.22 0.02 -0.02 0.46 0.37 0.05 0.94 0.07 0.11
Number of analysts following -0.22 0.00 -0.05 -0.21 0.00 -0.04 -0.37 0.30 -0.12 -0.84 0.13 -0.22
Analyst forecast dispersion -5.66 <.0001 -0.07 -5.61 <.0001 -0.07 -9.61 0.00 -0.16 -14.77 <.0001 -0.27
Number of public offerings -0.11 0.44 -0.01 -0.10 0.46 -0.01 0.46 0.37 0.06 0.85 0.15 0.12
Number of M&A deals 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.09
Diversified inst. Investor 1.41 0.42 0.09
N 12,836 12,836 211 211
Adj. R
2 0.114 0.115 0.078 0.143
Model (1) Model (2) Model (4)
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